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The
Mining Standard's
COMMENTS on the WAR

AND THE EUROPEAN SITUATION,
With 3 Maps.

By the Author of
"Germany and Good Faith."



CRITCHLEY PARKER,
Mining Standard,
Melbourne and Sydney.
1914.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

The pamphlet, entitled "The European War," issued from the "Mining Standard" office, met with such general appreciation as to lead to the publication of this, which may be regarded as a sequel. From the earlier pamphlet there has been incorporated two articles: one describing the beginning of the war, and the other, which has been styled "truly prophetic," anticipating Germany's plan of campaign. These two articles, together with one which appeared in the "Mining Standard," August 13, and was published separately as a continuation of the matter contained in the pamphlet, are repeated at the end of this booklet, so that those who are interested may see what have been the views of the paper from week to week, and to what extent those views have been justified by the event. The articles on the situation have been styled "Notes and Anticipations," and the first of them given is thus No. 3, the earliest of these which has not as yet been published otherwise than in the columns of the paper.



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A WAR OF EXTERMINATION.


September 10, 1914.

What is not yet grasped by many people is that the war under which civilisation is now reeling is absolutely a war of extermination. It is to be noted that, since we resolved to devote this leader to the subject, the fact has been amply recognised and insisted upon by the ex-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Lord Rosebery, who said in a speech at Broxburn, near Edinburgh: "If our armies conquer, we destroy for ever. Make no mistake; this war will not be ended by the cession of territory or by a money indemnity. It is a fight to a finish. If we go under now we go under for ever." As far as the fate of Great Britain is concerned, it is recognised that a German triumph will mean practically the wiping-out of the British Empire; but it is not so fully recognised that the triumph of the allies must mean the wiping-out of the German Empire, as at present constituted. The Powers cannot permit the continued existence of an Empire which has turned Europe into a hell of fear and fever, of hate and tyranny, ever since it came into being. The Prussian domination which has converted the peaceable German into an arrogant, insufferable, truculent, bloodthirsty brute, has got to cease, in the interests of civilisation; and the allies will be as determined as they were in 1814 against Napoleon to put an end once and for all to a state of affairs that has been a tremendous drain upon the resources of every one of them, and has made of peace itself a horror scarcely less dreadful than the horror of war. That is another reason why those insane or ignorant optimists who still think that this war will be quickly over will suffer a grievous disappointment. Whatever the German successes may be, the allies will not dare to give in. To do so would be to sign their own death warrants and place themselves under the heel of a Power that has shown itself as brutal and as overbearing as any Power that has ever disgraced the pages of history. And if, on the other hand, it be the allies who come out on top, as we hope and believe it will be, it will be no use for Germany to seek to make conditions of peace: she will have to fight on to the death or to agree to an almost unconditional surrender. That will, doubtless, be gall and wormwood to her Kaiserly pride; and so the war may be trusted to be protracted and bitter. For the bitterness of it Germany will have only herself to thank, since she has

MINING STANDARD'S

begun it in a way that has made the name of German stink throughout the civilised world. In our last week's issue we referred to some of the wickednesses of which her troops had been guilty; since then there has come additional proof of their infamous practice of carrying women and children in front of them as a screen from the gunfire of the allies. Against chivalrous troops this, of course, has the desired effect of stopping the fire: against German troops it may well be believed that such conduct would have no effect whatever. We now learn, too, from a presumably unprejudiced source, Mr. Richard Harding Davis, the American novelist, that the German official report of the destruction of Louvain ascribes that piece of wickedness, unequalled in the history of civilised Europe in modern times, to revenge for a single act of aggression on the part of a boy! It seems, in fact, to be all part of a policy of reducing the unfortunate Belgians to a state of sheer terror. It is in accordance with that policy that Zeppelins and aeroplanes drop bombs over cities that are undefended—one of the many German violations of the terms of the Hague Convention. New statements of German atrocities include such acts as the killing of wounded, the forcing of prisoners to enter the field against the allies of their own country, treacherous acts under cover of the white flag, and the shooting of Professors of the Louvain University for the crime of having in their possession proofs of the atrocities committed by the German troops. The Austrians seem to be no better, if it be true that they bound together and shot 80 prisoners at Shabatz, and then bayoneted the bodies, "for practice"; that they decapitated 14 young girls; that they massacred, after the engagement of Loshnitzer, 100 men, women, and children; and that the Government instructions to the soldiery were that all combatants in Serbia, whether uniformed or not, were to be killed (severe punishment being promised for those who disregarded these instructions), that, where Austrian troops were fired at by civilians, hostages must be executed, and that inhabitants failing to give information to the troops were to be hanged. Austria and Germany used to be thought of as civilised countries. No one thinks of them in that way now; and, in Germany, the contemptible paltriness of the spirit of vindictiveness displayed against the countries she so wantonly attacked is no less marked than her brutality, as is shown in the incident of the burning of the French, Russian, and British pavilions at the Printers' Exhibition in Leipzig. Although the exhibits shown in these pavilions had been sent at German request, no attempt was made to save them from destruction; and it is not too much to surmise that they were deliberately set on fire by this highly cultured people. In all these circumstances, and in further consideration of that "callous disavowal of treaties" to which the "New York World" has called attention, it is not to be wondered at if the allies regard this war as an absolute war of annihilation so far as Germany is concerned. As for Austria, it is looked upon as a mere contemptible cat-spaw, to be regarded with as much pity as animosity.

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.




Map showing the extent of the German Empire (the Holy Roman Empire) at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

THE GROWTH OF GERMANY.

That Germany has been even bigger than she is at present is shown in the first of the three interesting maps that are reproduced herewith. This map shows the size of the Empire at the time of the Reformation, when Luxemburg, Holland, Belgium, the Northern and a great deal of Eastern France, a very considerable portion of Austria down to the Adriatic, Switzerland, and Italy almost as far South as Rome, formed a part of the Empire. On the other hand, Schleswig, and the three provinces of Posen, West Prussia, and East Prussia, were outside her bounds.


The second and third of the three maps shown illustrate the growth of the kingdom of Prussia, which is the "predominant partner" in that federation of States which makes up the German Empire. Originally, Brandenburg, which is the mother state, consisted of a small area around Berlin. It gradually extended, acquiring partly by treaty and partly by robbery, various territories, some adjoining on its own, and some widely separated from it. In 1618 it acquired East Prussia, which lay outside the German Empire, and was separated from Brandenburg by West Prussia. Both the Prussias belonged to the Polish Crown, and for East Prussia the Elector of Brandenburg had to pay homage to the King of Poland. It was not till 30 years later that, by the acquisition of Eastern Pomerania, Brandenburg itself got an outlet to the sea. East Prussia was only freed from the dominion of Poland in 1657, and it was towards the close of the 17th century that Prussia was elevated into a kingdom (it had previously been a duchy), the Elector of Brandenburg becoming King in Prussia. Very big additions to the Prussian territory were made by Frederick the Great, who filched Silesia from Austria, and robbed Poland of West Prussia in the first of those three infamous partitions by which the Kingdom of Poland, which had at one time stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea, was practically wiped out of existence. His successor, Frederick William II., made still greater additions to the kingdom, adding the two extensive areas marked on the first of the two maps devoted to this subject as "South Prussia" and "New East Prussia," the whole of the latter of which and portion of the former have since passed into Russian hands. The Treaty of Tilsit, which Napoleon imposed on Prussia after smashing her at Jena, considerably reduced Prussian territory, but some of this was won back after the tyrant's fall. Since then Prussia's gains,



Map showing the growth of Brandenburg-Prussia to the end of the eighteenth century.

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

under the masterly leadership of Bismarck, have been enormous; not only did she acquire, under that brilliant but unscrupulous statesman, the hegemony of Germany, but also she incorporated within her own territory Schleswig, Holstein, Lauenburg, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Homburg, Hohenzollern, Nassau, Frankfurt, and portion of Hesse-Darmstadt. Since then, Prussia has been unquestionable mistress of Germany, and it is almost equally unquestionable that it is Prussia that has rushed Germany into the war which is now devastating Europe.



Map showing the growth of Prussia during the nineteenth century.

WHY THE EMPIRE IS AT WAR.

August 27, 1914.


Those who go to the front ought not to be without a clear idea of the cause for which they are fighting. It is advisable that they should not be so densely ignorant as that scientific gentleman who is reported to have said that Great Britain and Germany had gone to war over a trumpery quarrel in Servia with which Great Britain had no concern. That quarrel between Austria and Servia need not have led to a war between Germany and any other nation. That it did so was entirely Germany's fault.

When Austria, egged on (beyond all reasonable doubt) by Germany, declared war against Servia, she knew perfectly well that active operations on her part were bound to bring Russia into the field. She knew it, and Germany knew it; and the step was taken in the light of that knowledge. Russia, in consequence, began mobilising; and Germany, in her anxiety to throw the blame for an outbreak of hostilities on Russia, demanded that that mobilisation should cease. The demand was ignored; and Germany thereupon declared war.


Had matters stopped there, with only Germany and Austria on the one side and Russia and Servia on the other, Great Britain would still not have been involved; but France was bound to Russia in a defensive alliance, and so war could not be restricted to the four countries named. In point of fact, however, Germany never waited to see whether or not France would fulfil her obligations, but, without any warning and without any declaration of war, began massing troops against France and performing certain acts of definite aggression. This, alone, was sufficient warrant for England's interference, as will be explained below; but, as if this was not sufficient, Germany also violated the neutrality of Belgium—a neutrality which Prussia, now the principal State of the German Empire, had undertaken to defend. Belgium appealed to Great Britain for assistance, and Great Britain could not have ignored that appeal without forfeiting all claim to be regarded as a country whose word was to be held as sacred. Great Britain gave Germany fair notice that she would not allow Belgium's neutrality to be violated, and Germany took no heed. The blame for Great Britain's participation in the war lies, therefore, entirely on Germany's shoulders.

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

There can be little doubt that Germany reckoned, as her people always have reckoned, that, when it came to the point, Great Britain would shirk her duty, desert those with whom she was in alliance, and ignore her guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium. They were judging by German standards of good faith, and not by English standards; but, had they had any common sense, they would have realised not only that Great Britain was bound in honour to stand by Belgium and to support France, but also that she was bound to do so by every consideration for her own welfare. The interests of Great Britain are vitally bound up with the question of the balance of power in Europe; and, had she left Belgium and France at the mercy of Germany, her influence in the world would have become a negligible quantity, and she would have been marked out for destruction by the statesmen of every other Power, both those whom she had deceived and abandoned and those who had reckoned on her perfidy. Quite apart from this fact, however, she could not afford to stand aside, even had she not been one of Belgium's guarantors, and even had she not entered into an *entente* with France and Russia. The secret of British policy in Europe has always been to prevent any one power becoming overwhelmingly strong. In the latter half of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century Spain was the enemy; and in the latter part of the 17th and the whole of the 18th century, France. Of late years it has been Germany. Great Britain has not only seen Germany striving to win from her the mastery of the seas, but she has known the Central European nation's desire to obtain possession of Holland and Belgium, and she has known that either of these, in the hands of a strong and ambitious empire like Germany, would constitute a threat to the very life of the British Empire; so, if Great Britain took up the quarrel of France and Belgium, it was not merely from a feeling of chivalry or from a sense of honour, nor even from a fear that Germany was becoming too powerful, though all these reasons obtained to a greater or lesser degree, but, above all, because the checkmating of Germany, in her move against Belgium and against France, was to Great Britain a matter of life and death.




Town Hall (Hotel de Ville), Louvain



A Wing of the Hotel de Ville, Louvain.


VIEWS OF THE HISTORIC CITY OF LOUVAIN, BELGIUM,



Entrance to the Hotel de Ville, Louvain.



Grand' Place, Louvain.



St. Peter's Church (Eglise St. Pierre), Louvain.
REDUCED TO ASHES BY THE BARBARIANS, 1914, A.D.

THE DUTIES OF NEUTRALS.

September 3, 1914.

There are not many great neutral countries in the world at the present time. The United States and Italy are the two most important. Next to them come Spain, Holland, Roumania, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The one of these to which both parties in the European struggle will be inclined to pay attention is the United States. What, then, is the duty of the United States in the present juncture? for let it not be overlooked that neutrals have their duties as well as belligerents. It is, above all things, their duty to see that the countries engaged in war conduct their operations with a minimum of brutality and ferocity and with a maximum of consideration for non-combatants and of mercy for the wounded. What, then, will the United States say to the conduct of the German troops? Let some of the incidents already reported be detailed. Firstly, we have an improper use of the Red Cross, men firing under the shadow of its flag and mounting quick-firers in Red Cross waggons, so that they may get close to the ranks of the enemy without being fired at. Secondly, we have a massacring of prisoners. This is a crime that has not yet been attributed to the Germans; but it is attributed to the Austrians, who are said to have massacred all their prisoners in Shabatz before the Servians entered that town. Thirdly, we have the habit, which seems to be common to both Austrians and Germans, of making inoffensive people hostages. Fourthly, we have the truly diabolical German habit of using non-combatants (including women and children) as a screen for their troops upon the march. Fifthly, we have a statement so horrible that one is loth to believe it, even of Germans, though these are showing themselves the most barbarous people who have ever waged war in modern times—the statement that they closed down Belgian coal mines when the unfortunate coal miners were below ground, thus condemning them to one of the most fearful of deaths. Sixthly, we have quite unnecessary brutality in the slaughtering of populations because one or two amongst them have indulged in “sniping,” this being a crime which is not new to Germany, since she indulged in it in the war of 1870-1. Seventhly, we have the imposition of most extortionate demands upon captured cities. Eighthly, we have the wickedness of threatening to shoot innocent burgomasters, if these rapacious demands are not acceded to. Ninthly, we have the most wanton destruction of property, as in the case of the reducing to ashes of so interesting and beautiful an old-world town as Louvain. Tenthly, we have the sowing of the sea with bombs, to the danger of all neutral shipping.

There are only two ways in which such proceedings, constituting as they do the greatest disgrace to the name of German and to the reputation of Germany, are to be brought to an end. One is a

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

realisation by the Germans that they will not prove victorious in the war. If they felt that, they would perhaps see the advisability of not arousing a vindictive hatred that will induce the most shocking reprisals when French and Belgian troops enter German territory. If they have to fall back through Belgium, fighting all the way, it will be a sad case for the German wounded left upon the field of battle, for there will be little mercy for them, after the way in which they have roused the worst passions of the people they have so brutally ill-used. But the arrogant German is very little likely to consider the probability of defeat: he seems to be constitutionally incapable of imagining that he can be beaten; and so he will not realise that his brutality is likely to recoil upon his own head or upon the heads of unfortunate non-combatant Germans who have had nothing to do with these atrocities. Putting aside, then, the chance of an abandonment of Germany's disgraceful methods of warring against non-combatants on the ground of fear of reprisals, we have to fall back on the second hope, and that is that the neutral powers will convey to Germany in no measured language their determination that this sort of thing shall cease. If the United States take such action, she will earn the respect of the world; if she take no such action, she must shoulder a portion of the blame for what may occur; for let it be recognised that Germany, after alienating almost the whole of Europe, cannot afford to run the risk of destroying whatever shreds of sympathy she may still possess in the United States, especially as, when it comes to negotiations for a termination of the war, she will be very happy to have the United States upon her side, instead of having that country look upon her as a menace to civilisation and an empire that ought to be wiped out of existence.

The time for the United States to intervene is now. If she wait, she will lose the opportunity. If the German army be forced to retreat, or if operations be transferred to German soil, it will be no use then for President Wilson to protest against retaliatory acts by the allied forces, for he will at once be met with an indignant reminder that he made no effective protest against the truly shocking conduct of the Germans. If, on the contrary, the Germans march on and succeed in entering Paris, what will happen then? They will endeavour to impose the most frightful terms on France, and will threaten that, if their demands be not acceded to, they will lay Paris in ruins, even as they have laid Louvain. Then the United States will speak in a voice of thunder on behalf of civilisation; and Germany, arrogant and truculent as ever (or, indeed, puffed up with pride, made more arrogant and truculent than ever), will tell the United States to mind its own business. As we have said, it will then be too late, and the American people, shocked at the vandalism and cruelty of Germany, and shocked at the destruction of so great and so historic a city as Paris, will force their Government to declare war against him whom Maeterlinck has rightly called the "enemy of mankind," in order to avenge a wrong which earlier action would have enabled them to prevent. As we have said, the time for a great neutral power to insist upon this war being conducted as war should be conducted, is NOW.

THE VICTORS' TERMS.

September 10, 1914.

One hears many predictions as to the terms that will be imposed by the nations which come out on top in the present world-shaking war, and it may be of interest to consider dispassionately what is likely to be the territorial changes effected by it. It is not, however, advisable merely to restrict consideration, as most people do, to the supposition that the allies will achieve a triumph. There are two other possibilities: one is that the Austro-German alliance may be victorious; and the other that operations may end in a species of stalemate. This latter possibility gives of course no occasion for consideration; but thought must be given to what will happen in the event of an Austro-German triumph, as well as to what will happen in the event of an Austro-German disaster.

In his book, "Germany and Good Faith," the writer has stated what terms he believes Germany would impose upon the United Kingdom if the British fleet were smashed to pieces, and the Kingdom starved into submission, as in that eventuality it might very quickly be. These terms would include a simply tremendous and crippling indemnity, the surrender of Egypt, a prohibition of the building of a new fleet of any dimensions, and a restriction of England's right to enter into alliances with foreign powers. Under such terms the British Empire would simply cease to be, for the Dominions would have to drop off unless they wished to suffer from all the restrictions inflicted on the United Kingdom. This, of course, is not the idea of a considerable number of Australians, who talk very glibly about Australia being the first thing Germany would demand. They do not consider the stupidity of such a demand on Germany's part. This country, as a great self-governing dominion, could simply not be handed over by Great Britain, and Germany would have to conquer it; but that conquest could not be made except as the result of years of effort. Germany would be working at a tremendous distance from her base; she would have to employ hundreds of thousands of men for the purpose; and, if ever she succeeded in breaking down the opposition throughout the whole of the extensive area of Australia, she would have to keep here an army of occupation of, at the very least, one hundred thousand men; she would have the United States on her

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

tracks, because that country could not afford to see a nation so powerful as Germany would then be acquiring pre-eminence in the Pacific; and she would have in addition to acquire many other places besides Australia, to afford coaling stations between Europe and this part of the world, as otherwise her Australian dominion would be so entirely cut off from headquarters that it would be impossible for her to hold it in the event of another great war. No; there are very many parts of the British Empire that Germany will need to have if she is to have Australia, and therefore these others must of necessity be demanded before this country is.

The terms to be imposed on France in the event of a German triumph will also be exceedingly onerous, and the indemnity will be many times that 200 millions which Bismarck found so incapable of crushing France in 1871. The territorial demand will not perhaps be great, save that Germany will want Morocco, and perhaps Cochinchina, but there will probably be a stringent prohibition of any serious war establishment, and France, like Great Britain, will be deprived of all real independence. Belgium will undoubtedly be annexed; and Holland will be forced to ask permission to enter the German Empire. Portugal, for the crime of having adhered to Great Britain, in accordance with her treaty obligations, will be forced to cede that portion of her African territory which Germany has long coveted, and perhaps also to cede at least one of her groups of Atlantic Islands, with a view to giving Germany a good coaling station. Russia she will probably be content to let off very lightly, not demanding any territorial gains from that empire, though the Baltic provinces will tempt her greed.

So much for Germany. Austria-Hungary, in the event of the collapse of the allies, will assuredly insist on the subordination, perhaps the annexation, of Servia and Montenegro, and will probably also demand a big strip of the Albanian coast-line. From Russia she will be likely to insist upon receiving a very large slice of Russian Poland. If Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece also step into the field on behalf of the allies she may also want considerable territorial concessions from both Bulgaria and Roumania, and she will almost certainly insist upon Greece ceding her the port of Salonika (so that she may have free entry to the Mediterranean, other than through the Adriatic), and upon securing for herself the country dividing that port from Servia.

If Italy come into the war on the side of the allies, both Germany and Austria may be trusted to bleed it to the utmost of its capacity. Territorially, Germany will probably want Tunis, and Austria the whole of the Albanian coast-line; and, though this latter acquisition will not take anything from Italy, it will rob her of what she looks upon as her future, and will give Austria a fair chance of becoming predominant in the Adriatic. If Italy remain neutral, then her day of reckoning is only deferred, for assuredly she will be made to pay for her refusal to help the two central European powers in the war they so deliberately brought about.

If Turkey join forces with Austria and Germany and these powers prove triumphant, Turkey will probably receive back all the territory that she lost in her war with the Balkan Alliance, with the exception of a strip of the Albanian coast, which, it is already intimated, will be demanded by Austria. It is probable, too, that Turkey will obtain at least some territory that she had lost prior to the Balkan war, and the Island of Crete will probably become hers, subject to certain conditions which both Austria and Germany will know thoroughly well that Turkey has not the slightest intention of adhering to.

Now for the other side. If, as is sincerely to be hoped, the allies achieve an unquestionable triumph, entering Berlin, entering Vienna, and bringing both the central European Empires to their knees, what is to happen then? Let us first take the case of Austria. Servia's demand will be certainly for the annexation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina, while Montenegro will demand the port of Cattaro, and probably a further strip of Dalmatia. Russia will assuredly claim Galicia and Bukowina, making the Austrian frontier the Carpathians. If, as is likely, Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece also join in the fray on the one side and Turkey on the other, Italy's demands will include the cession by Austria of Trieste and the Trentino, and probably she will also receive the port of Avlona and the surrounding territory in Albania, which will give her the entire command of the Adriatic. Roumania will of course want that portion of Hungary which is still known as "Transylvania," though politically it has been entirely incorporated in the Hungarian kingdom. The bulk of the population of this former principality is Roumanian. Amongst its people, who are very discontented with Hungarian rule, annexation by Roumania would be very popular.

If Turkey venture upon hostilities, and the allies prove triumphant, Greece and Bulgaria will mop up between them all of European Turkey, with the exception perhaps of Constantinople; Great Britain, besides increasing her hold on the shores of the Persian Gulf, will dispose of the last shred of Turkey's authority in Egypt; and the Arab tribes will probably be encouraged to declare their independence and to assume the caliphate, which has hitherto been the Ottoman's trump card in Islam. Armenia and Syria may perhaps be converted into independent monarchies, or the former may be annexed by Russia, and the latter left under the control of the Turks. In any case Turkey has far more to lose than to gain by a participation in the war; and, if the result of hostilities be something in the nature of a stalemate, it is more than likely that Turkey will be sacrificed by her Austro-German allies, who will be quite ready to sacrifice her to secure better terms for themselves. The main stumbling-block is Constantinople. This city is of such importance that no one of the allies will be willing for it to go to any other one. Bulgaria, Greece, Russia—each will object to seeing any other one of them installed in it. It is possible that the Turks will be left in control; but the likeliest solution of the trouble is the city's internationalisation and establishment as an independent neutral area. It is probable

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

that this time, after their previous experience, Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia (and Roumania, too) have come to a very definite understanding as to how the Turkish territory is to be divided in the event of the overthrow of the Turkish Empire. Probably, with a view to the mitigation of their insatiable mutual jealousies, they have all agreed to be internationalisationists so far as Constantinople is concerned.

But, for Australia, for Great Britain, and indeed for the world at large, the most interesting question is, What will be done with Germany, if the allies prove triumphant? Russia, it is quite plain, means to have the province of Posen, and she may, not improbably, also put in a demand for East Prussia. France will assuredly want the whole of the territory of which she was deprived in 1871, and both she and Belgium may demand to have the Rhine as an eastern boundary. Japan will want Kiau Chiau, and will get it, unless it remains unconquered at the close of the war. Apia will probably pass to New Zealand control, and portion of the German possessions nearer Australia will come to the Commonwealth—probably German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago—while the Union of South Africa will probably take toll of portion of the German possessions in the Dark Continent. Any one, however, who supposes that all conquered colonial territory will be retained may prepare himself for disappointment.

Great Britain will probably ask for no territorial extensions for herself, but will insist that the German fleet shall be sunk or otherwise disposed of, in order that Germany shall be rendered powerless on the water. She may also insist on the recession of Schleswig to Denmark, which would be a fatal blow to German ambitions, since the cession would carry with it the Kiel Canal. But there are two other things which, not only Great Britain, but every one of the powers engaged in this mortal conflict will insist upon, if Germany be brought to her knees. One is that she shall pay an exceedingly heavy indemnity for all the cost to which she has put other nations, and for all the wanton damage she has inflicted during this war. The other is that she shall be deprived of the power to do again such mischief as she has done, not only this year, but in the 50 years preceding it. Steps will be taken to disarm her, but precisely how this will be accomplished it is not easy to say. Perhaps it will be by mere insistence that the size of her army must be kept within certain defined limits; but it may take the form of bringing about a break-up of the German Empire. It would not take much to induce Bavaria to set up as an independent kingdom, especially if by doing so she could escape portion of her share of the indemnity, and there are many of the other German States that would feel the same way. And even in the Kingdom of Prussia there are territories that would be only too glad of the opportunity to throw off the Prussian yoke. Such a one is Hanover.

The allies, however, may not endeavour to bring about any such break-up of the federation of the German States, if the

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

German people themselves put an end to the military and imperial domination from which they have suffered, and establish a Republic on a purely democratic basis, for it will be felt that, with the elimination of the Hohenzollerns and the hateful military caste that they have encouraged, and indeed created, Germany will cease to be the woful menace that she has been for so many years to the peace of Europe.

It is not improbable, indeed, that the present war may result, not only in the break-up of the German Empire, but also in the break-up of the Austrian. I have indicated what demands are likely to be made upon that Empire by the countries with which she is now at war and others with which there is a chance of her being at war within the course of a few weeks; but her troubles will probably not stop there. The Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia and the Slovaks in Northern Hungary are not at all unlikely to rise in rebellion if the dual monarchy get into a really tight corner, and perhaps the result of all this series of disasters will be the long-expected split between Austria and Hungary. Another possibility is that Austria may be made once more into an almost purely German Empire by the transference to it under a federal bond of those South German States which came within the Prussian orbit only after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. In that case Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia may possibly be incorporated in a great Servian kingdom, which will include Bosnia and Montenegro as well as Servia itself; but there are many difficulties in the way of that, and they are at least as likely to constitute a separate kingdom. But indeed what will be done with these portions of Austria-Hungary in the event of the collapse of the Empire is something that cannot be forecasted with any certainty, so numerous are the possibilities. And it is not to be overlooked that there is a chance—and a very good chance too—of Austria obtaining favourable terms by a speedy admission of defeat and abandonment of her German ally.

NOTES AND ANTICIPATIONS.

III.

August 20, 1914.

There has been no great change in the position since the present writer penned the notes which appeared in last week's issue of the "Mining Standard," that is to say, so far as has been revealed by the cables. The most interesting developments have been political rather than military. The most interesting of all, perhaps, was Russia's announcement of her intention to give Poland a large measure of autonomy, and to restore to the Poles the free use of their language and the free exercise of their religion. This is unquestionably a bid for Polish support; and the effect of it has yet to be seen. It may be remembered that in the "Mining Standard" of August 6 it was pointed out that, by giving the Poles within her territory autonomy and justice, Russia would be dealing a very nasty blow at Germany, inasmuch as the Germans are detested by the Poles far more than are the Russians. Practically at the same moment, a Melbourne daily was declaring that the converse was true, and that the Poles were better treated and better satisfied in Germany than anywhere else. The same paper has since mended its views, and published a statement to the exactly contrary effect; and indeed there can be no doubt that the Poles in Prussia would prefer the Russian yoke to the German. There should not, therefore, be much doubt that there will be much more real loyalty to the ruling power in Russian Poland than there will be in Prussian Poland, and that many of the residents of the latter will be tempted by the Russian offer, unless, indeed, they are altogether distrustful of it; but the interesting question is, what will be the effect on the Poles of Galicia? Austria has undoubtedly treated its Polish subjects far better than Russia and Germany have treated the Poles within their borders; and the Poles of Galicia have accordingly been amongst the most loyal of the peoples under the control of the Habsburgs. It is doubtful, then, if there will be much accession of strength to Russia from this quarter, especially as the Poles have not forgotten that, in the three infamous partitions of their country, Austria was much less blameworthy than either of the other two. The fact that they have always regarded Prussia as the prime mover in this piece of iniquity, although

she should by her treaty obligations have defended Poland, is a fact that is bound to tell against Germany in favour of Russia.

It is significant, too, that this gives us some idea of the territorial gains which Russia expects, or intends, to make as a result of the war. She intends, apparently, to acquire both Galicia and Prussian Poland. If she take in the province of Posen, which has an area of over 11,000 square miles and a population of over two millions, her boundary will come up to within two hours' train journey of Berlin, a circumstance not making for the strength of Germany; and, if she acquire possession of Galicia, which was Austria's share of the partition of Poland, the border between Austria-Hungary and Russia will then be the Carpathians, which will make Russia's position very much stronger, and Austria-Hungary's position very much weaker, than at present. With both these provinces acquired, it would be possible to recreate the Poland that existed at the time of the second partition in 1793, with the exception of Danzig and a small area around it, but with the addition of Galicia, of which it had already been robbed under the first partition. But it is far too early yet to say whether Russia will be able to achieve that which she evidently hopes to achieve: she may find many difficulties in the way, even if Germany and Austria be overcome.

Another fact of interest is that Russia is reported to be massing half a million troops on the Roumanian frontier. This may be regarded as an indication that Roumania has not given any assurance of sympathy with Russia in the present war. It does not follow, however, that there is belief that Roumania intends to intervene on behalf of the Hohenzollern-Habsburg coalition. It is, perhaps, merely a hint to her that she had better remain neutral if she does not intend to espouse Russia's cause. There are, in fact, three parties in Roumania—the pro-Austrian, the pro-Russian, and the independent—and the lastnamed may be divided into two sections, the one consisting of those who desire neutrality, and the other of those who wish to take part in the war, but are not prepared to say yet on which side it would be advisable to fight. That, they will say, is altogether a matter of circumstance.

Bulgaria, by one of those extraordinary somersaults to which it has accustomed us, is now said to be prepared to act with Greece against Turkey. If it do so, Roumania's action becomes even more uncertain that it has been. The latest news to hand at time of writing, however, reports a revolution at Sofia, and announces that a state of siege has been officially proclaimed. What this means one cannot say on the present meagre information; but it has to be borne in mind that Ferdinand has never been popular, and that his unpopularity has probably grown as a result of the disasters which his greed brought upon the kingdom on the conclusion of the first Balkan war. It is impossible to say what may be the outcome of events in this troubled State, whether the revolution has been suppressed or not.

Meanwhile Turkey's position is very dubious, but her purchase of the two German warships, the "Goeben" and the "Breslau," may

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

be really part of a game played with Germany to enable her to hold these vessels where they can readily and rapidly be used to strike at the Russian Black Sea Fleet. There is, then, a very great probability of Turkey being drawn into the war. Its position is perhaps somewhat complicated by the circumstance that the organisation of her navy is in the hands of British officers.

Japan is not yet actually taking part in the war, but its participation is only a matter of days or hours, for an ultimatum has been sent to Germany demanding the evacuation of Kiaochau before August 23. That Germany will refuse to agree to this demand goes without saying; hence Japan is likely to add one more to the seven countries already at war with either Germany or Austria. It is to be hoped that her entry into the struggle will not draw in the United States on the other side or affect the American sympathy for the British cause. We may be sure that such anti-British rags as the Hearst papers will make the utmost possible use of the circumstance to turn their readers' sympathies towards Germany.

Italy's position is still dubious, but it is significant that she is calling on Austria to either make her blockade of Montenegro effective or allow free intercourse between that little kingdom and Italy. In so doing, the Italian Government is showing a readiness to quarrel with Austria that, in view of what has already been said in these columns, is not astonishing. It will not be surprising to learn that the Italian Navy is quietly preparing to act against the Austrian Fleet (and it will be very ready to seek to wipe out the disgrace of its defeat by Tegetthoff in the battle of Lissa in 1866), and that troops are quietly being massed in the vicinity of the Austrian frontier.

Most interesting of all, however, is the question of Holland. The great commercial centres of the Netherlands are almost entirely under German control; but the greater part of the country is anti-German. Though a section of the anti-German party may wish Holland to declare war against Germany, there is certainly no influential section of the pro-German party which desires Holland to be drawn into the war at all. That is because Holland can make a very handsome profit for herself and can be of very real assistance to Germany by having her ports open, as can be the case only so long as she remains neutral; but, if it be all to the advantage of Germany for Holland to remain neutral, it follows that it is all to the advantage of the allied forces for her to be drawn into the struggle. It is better for the allies for Holland to be ranged with Germany than for her to remain neutral, since in the former case her ports could be blockaded by the British Fleet and the principal over-sea source of food supplies for Germany cut off. The Government of the Netherlands would like to remain at peace, but it would certainly much rather place itself on the side of the allies than on the side of Germany; yet it is quite on the cards that it may be driven into the latter camp. France's action in delivering an ultimatum to Holland against allowing German troops to enter her territory is not without significance.

MINING STANDARD'S

Now that Austria is at war with both France and Great Britain, the only countries through which Germany can obtain food supplies are Holland, Italy, Roumania, and the three Scandinavian countries. Holland is certainly the chief source; if this be cut off, and Italy join in with the allies, the chief source remaining will be Roumania, which is a great granary; but it is not at all certain that Roumania herself will be able to stand out of the war, and in that case Norway, Sweden, and Denmark will be the only three means by which Germany and Austria can obtain food from outside. If the Russian Baltic Fleet could manage to stop supplies coming from Norway and Sweden, as she certainly could not do if the Baltic were open to the German Fleet, there would only remain Denmark; and even Denmark's participation in the war is a possibility. If she were offered the recovery of Schleswig in return for shutting off German supplies, she would perhaps be not unprepared to take the risk. Unless Germany is to win all along the line, this chance of starving her out affords the greatest likelihood of the war being brought to an early termination.

The action of Austria in sending a couple of corps to the assistance of Germany, one in Belgium and one in Alsace, has had the inevitable result of causing France and Great Britain to declare war against the dual monarchy, since both of these corps will be taking part in operations against French troops, and one of them in operations in which British troops also are concerned. It is a great sign of weakness that so early in her campaign Germany should have had to call upon Austria for this assistance. She had expected by this time to be well over the Belgian frontier into France, and to have gained at least one great victory over a terrified French army. Instead of that, she has had to realise that she is not certain of gaining unassisted any victory whatever.

It is difficult to say how much reliance can be placed on the war news which reaches us, but, so far as one can see, the French troops are proving their superiority to the Germans. This is not altogether surprising, for the German is turned too much into a mere military machine, whereas the French soldier is encouraged to develop a spirit of initiative which is of the highest value in military operations. The Frenchman is a great fighter when everything is going well with him, and the effect upon his morale of the initial successes gained over the Germans should be tremendous, while the Germans are liable to be somewhat downcast by their very obvious failure to attain all that their leaders had intended them to obtain in a very limited space of time. As things are now, one may expect four Frenchmen or even four Belgians to be as good as five Germans in a hand-to-hand struggle. As, in addition, the French artillery seems to be outranging the German artillery, and beating it also both in accuracy and in rapidity of fire, and as the number of troops engaged in the forthcoming conflict is pretty nearly equal, it will be a great disappointment if the Germans do not meet with a severe defeat; but, even if they do not sustain such a defeat, their position will not be satisfactory, from the Austro-German point of view, unless they gain a most complete victory.

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

The most sensible thing that has yet been said about the war is Sir Rider Haggard's advice to Canadian volunteers not to enter upon it in a mere holiday spirit. The counsel is worth heeding by our own lads. Too many of them are talking, absurdly enough, as if the war will be over before they have crossed the seas, and as if they will be getting a mere holiday jaunt free of cost. Those who enlist in that expectation will be doomed to bitter disappointment. Not that it is to be supposed for one moment that our lads are desirous of escaping the real hard work of fighting: no one who knows them will suggest that. They have, however, listened to a lot of loose talk as to the impossibility of the war lasting more than three or four months, and they little realise what is meant by such a conflict of forces as are engaged. We had the same sort of thing happen in 1900, when many of our troops went away from here in the firm belief that military operations would be at an end before they arrived in South Africa. We have also to remember that woful miscalculation of the American volunteers of the early part of 1861, who enlisted for three months, because they were confident that that space of time would easily permit of the wiping out of the Southern secession movement. Those miscalculators—at least those of them who did not retire from the front the moment their term was up—had four years of the hardest fighting that distinguished the 19th century. How long this war will last it is impossible to say; but Lord Kitchener's estimate of eighteen months does not seem excessive. But, of course, much will depend upon the way events shape themselves.

A fact to which much too little attention has been paid by the Australian Press is the revelation of the use to which the German Embassy in St. Petersburg was put. It has long been suspected that one of the principal objects of those representing Germany in foreign countries has been to create internal trouble. The discovery of revolutionary literature and of arms, ammunition, and explosives in the offices of the German Embassy at St. Petersburg affords ample proof of the correctness of these surmises. What is to be thought of a nation that permits, and indeed authorises, its representatives to act the part of the traitor within the gates in the countries to which they are accredited? Such a country has surely reached the lowest depths of ignominy yet attained by any European State.

Has it been pointed out by anyone that August 1st, the day on which Germany declared war against Russia, was the 50th anniversary of the signing of the preliminaries of peace between Denmark on the one hand and Prussia and Austria and the various German States on the other, after the war waged against the little Scandinavian kingdom to rob her of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg? That was one of the most infamous robberies of modern times; and it would indeed be retribution if Germany's action on August 1st, 1914, were to result in her undoing, and in the recession to Denmark of that Schleswig through which she has cut the Kiel Canal. If that were effected, it would shatter at one blow Germany's hopes of becoming a first-class naval Power; and

MINING STANDARD'S

it is, therefore, the one thing above all others that Great Britain should insist upon.

If, as all true Britishers will hope, this war end in the utter discomfiture of Germany, will the Hohenzollern dominance in that Empire be given a fatal blow? It is significant, perhaps, that, while all talk of socialistic trouble has ceased in Russia, in France, and in Great Britain, opposition to the war is (if we may trust the cables) strong in Germany. That is because, whether in France or in Great Britain, the working classes realise that the war is not a war of aggression on the part of their country, but has been forced upon it by Germany; while in Russia it is held that the Russian Government could have done no less than it did do. If, then, the war go against Germany, there may probably be a very extreme reaction against the bureaucrats who precipitated this conflict. If it should end in the democratising of Germany, in the restricting—or, still better, in the entire elimination—of the power of the Kaiser, in the liberalising of Prussian institutions, and in the destruction of the Prussian dominance in the Empire, it would be well for the cause of peace and also for the cause of fair dealing in Europe.

IV.

August 27, 1914.

The war news of the week has been sensational, but, so far as the campaign is concerned, not vital. The occupation of Brussels is spectacular, and it will doubtless have its effect in heartening the German troops, but it is a move not without danger. So far as can be seen, the intention of the German army is to push on to the French frontier at a point east of Lille, with the object of turning the French left; but the risk run is that of having the French and Belgian forces drive a solid wedge between this western force of Germans and those who are in the vicinity of Liege and Namur, and cutting off the communications of the former. To venture any prediction would be unwise, because we really have no idea as to the relative strength of the two forces in Belgium, and on that it altogether depends whether the allies should venture to make an attempt to cut off this western German force, or whether it would be wiser for them to fall back towards the French frontier. It is no use predicting without a very thorough knowledge of the conditions; and these are unknown to anybody in Australia. Even the position of the Allies is unknown; but it will probably be found to be between the Sambre and the Meuse. If so, they will be attacked from three sides. To be able to do this successfully, the Germans will need to be in overwhelming strength. It will probably be found that this supposed turning movement is being effected by a quarter of a million of men.

Space forbids dealing at any length with the successes gained by the Russian and Servian troops; the former would appear to

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

have got going at last—very much sooner indeed than had been anticipated, but presumably they are not yet ready to let the full force of their pressure be felt. From Servia Austria has got a well-merited thrashing; and it will deceive no one that she loftily pretends that she is going henceforth to ignore Servia till a more fitting occasion, when, instead of waging war against her, she will simply send “a punitive expedition” to make her realise her sin in having ventured to resist Austrian aggression. By such an announcement as this, Austria is only making herself ridiculous. In this war all the glory has gone to Servia, and all the disgrace to her big antagonist.

It is not surprising that Great Britain, France, and Belgium are all of them complaining of the brutal and uncivilised methods of warfare being followed by the Germans. If one-half of the accusations made in France’s official protest be justified, Germany deserves to be wiped off the map of Europe. It is asserted that Germans have fired shots in the faces of wounded French and Belgian soldiers, and have deliberately opened and enlarged the wounds of others. This sounds really too terrible to be true. With regard to the statements that villages have been burnt to the ground, one must remember that the Germans will probably claim that, in every case where the action was not necessitated by supposed military considerations, the act was one of revenge, because shots had been fired at the troops by inhabitants. Though there is little to be said in favour of the German savagery, there may perhaps be some excuse for it on this score; for it is to be remembered that war is a time of extreme severity; but the other charges that remain are probably entirely true, and are absolutely unpardonable. The Germans seem to be in the habit of seizing the leading residents of the town or village they capture, making hostages of them, and using them, under threats of death, to extort heavy payments from the inhabitants, or to hold them in complete subjection. They are also accused of having driven women and children on to the battle field, presumably to afford shelter for the troops engaged; and the French Government is perhaps right in stating that such acts have never before dishonoured civilised belligerents. To the attacks on the Red Cross too much importance need not be attached, for they are as likely as not to have been cases of bad marksmanship rather than of deliberate wickedness; but the charge that dum-dum bullets are being used is one capable of easy proof, and, if it be true, the Germans should be regarded as quite outside the pale, and the French Government is not unwarranted in characterising them as “barbarians” and as “unbridled savages.” France already, in fact, gives a hint that it will not be able to continue to carry on the war according to the rules obtaining among civilised nations when Germany is conducting it in such a villainous manner. If the war develop into one of sheer savagery, the blame will lie at Germany’s door; and if, as is to be hoped, the bulk of this war be fought out on Germany’s own territory, her people will suffer, and suffer bitterly, for the cruel deeds now being performed by her own troops in a country which was not concerned

in Germany's quarrel, and on which she has deliberately forced war. She ought to remember that the Russians are already in her territory, and that it is not to her interest to arouse a spirit of brutal vindictiveness. We have already learnt that Russian refugees reaching Copenhagen reported that the ill-treatment to which they had been subjected in Germany was mitigated when the threat was made that every German in Russia would be sent to Siberia; but one does not think much of a nation that behaves as it ought to behave only when it is threatened with reprisals if it fail to do so.

The British complaint is with regard to the criminal sowing of mines in the main waterways of commerce. This conduct on the part of the Germans constitutes, in fact, an act of warfare not merely against the countries with which Germany is struggling, but against every country whose shipping uses the waters in which the mines are laid. At time of writing (Monday, the 24th) news is to hand of two Danish vessels having been destroyed by mines sown by these German criminals; and on one of these two boats all lives were lost. We have already heard of Norwegian and Dutch vessels being similarly destroyed; and it would serve Germany right if all these countries combined against her as a criminal against civilization. Not unjustly did Maeterlinck, the great Belgian dramatist, say that he took up arms to fight against "the enemy of mankind." That is a term which is likely to be applied to the Emperor William for many a day to come. Is it not delightful that he, the head of a nation that is waging war in a spirit of savagery, should pray "Give us grace to show ourselves Christians towards our enemies"? One wonders what Christ would have thought of the Kaiser's idea of Christian conduct. It was a German who said that there had been only one Christian, and he had died on the cross; and assuredly anything further from the spirit of mercy, of humility, and of tenderness that was Christ's than the arrogance, the brutality, and the conceit displayed by the German military class it is hard to conceive.

When one reads of the shocking ferocity of German troops and of their disregard for all the courtesies of war, when one hears of their insulting conquered peoples and of their Uhlans entering a conquered city with captive officers tied to their stirrup leathers, when one learns of their horrible rapacity and of reprisals upon innocent non-combatants, one must not, in one's indignation, blame the whole German people. Let us put these wickednesses down to the hateful military class, and remember that here amongst us we have a number of men of German race who are quite loyal to the British flag and who are as disgusted as ourselves at the conduct which is making the name of Germany detested throughout the civilised world.

Brutal repression seems to come naturally to the German. We not only have the examples of Schleswig, Poland, and Alsace in Germany itself, but we also have in Austria the treatment of the Czechs in Bohemia, and of the Croats in Dalmatia. In the latter province we hear of the altogether outrageous incident of the Monte-

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

negrins being warned that if they dare to attack Ragusa certain important hostages held by the Austrians, including amongst others a brother of the Montenegrin King, will be executed, and we have a revolt in Prague put down with something like an indiscriminate slaughter. This latter action is perhaps more pardonable than the other, because it was at least necessary for Austria to suppress the revolt; but to take hostages and threaten them, in order to prevent an invasion by a hostile country, is an act sufficient to warrant the classifying of Austria amongst savage nations.

Whether the Czechs will thus be put down or not is a matter of doubt. Of all Slavonic peoples they are probably the most true to the racial instinct, the most enthusiastic in their furtherance of the principles of Slav brotherhood; but, for all that, the idea that violent repression always defeats its own object is entirely mistaken. If we look back to the times of religious struggle in Europe, when the most shocking acts of bad faith and cruelty were done in the name of religion, we will find that in some cases at least those methods were successful. They failed notoriously with the Dutch; and we can see in our own day how the horrible, cold-blooded brutality which attended the attack on the Protestants in Ireland in 1641 has coloured the feelings which have animated the Ulsterman right up to the present day, and have imbued him with the idea that he would risk anything—fortune, life, material happiness—rather than be put under the heel of a people and of a faith whereby his forbears had been so treated. But repressive methods may be successful in any of three or four different ways. They may effect the entire extermination of a people, as the Albigensian heresy was stamped out by the perfidy and cruelty of that noteworthy champion of Christendom, Simon de Montfort; or it may be effected by wholesale transportations, or by a voluntary resignation of the struggle by people resolved to carry their ideas to other and freer lands, as the Moors in Spain did, after their free and enlightened tolerance had given place to the rabid intolerance and cruel treachery that disgraced Catholic Spain, or as the Huguenots did, when they quitted France to escape the horrors attendant on that frightful breach of faith known to history as the Revocation of Nantes. But there may be yet another way; and this is of interest because it applies to the Bohemians themselves. In the fifteenth century Bohemia was the great centre of the Protestant movement; but, by a gross piece of treachery, Hus, the head of the movement, was seized and burnt at the stake, and horrors followed of which it is best not to speak. The “heretics” were not exterminated; they did not emigrate; they were not driven away; but they found it advisable to change their faith, and to-day they are more or less good Catholics. If, then, they could be forced to a renunciation of their views in the matter of religion, may they not be forced to a renunciation of their race also? The Hussite movement was not, however, suppressed for many years, and only after a long and bloody warfare, and there is no reason to suppose that the Bohemians will allow their love of Slavdom to be stamped out without making a very fierce resistance.

The policy followed by the Austro-Hungarian commanders

will probably be to put Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian, and Croat regiments into the foremost fighting lines against Russia and Servia, so that, if they show any signs of disloyalty, they may be shot down by the German and Magyar regiments behind them. Their heavier losses will also have the effect of altering the proportion of the voting population to the advantage of the two ruling races—a result which would be highly pleasing to both German and Magyar.

It has been announced that the Czar will give autonomy to Poland, with the free use of the Polish language and the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion. This is undoubtedly a sop to secure Polish support. Now we have the same Empire offering the Jews such liberties as they have not previously known. As the one move is for the purpose of securing the support of Russian Poles and preventing the German and Austrian Poles from espousing the cause of the empires to which they are subject, so this latest move is not due to any sense of justice, but in order to favourably impress those big foreign financiers who are the pawnbrokers of Europe, and who are all, or nearly all, of Jewish race. One would have thought more of Russia had these concessions been made in time of peace, when the policy underlying them was less obvious.

The attempt of Russia to win over the Poles will probably not be found to be attended with a great deal of success so far as Galicia is concerned. As was pointed out in the "Standard" last week, the Galician Poles have been well treated by Austria, and are amongst the most loyal of the peoples governed by the Emperor-King; but the prospect of a union of all the Poles under one Government, and the further prospect of self-government in such a union, may prove attractive. The great stumbling block will be the presence of the Ruthenians in Galicia. Between the Ruthenians and the Poles there is the bitterest hatred; and the Ruthenians, who are mostly peasantry and ill-educated, have not been at all well treated by the Poles, who constitute the landed proprietors of the province. The Ruthenians belong to the Orthodox Church, or at least to a branch of it, while the Poles are Roman Catholics; and, though both are Slavs, they speak quite different dialects. The Ruthenian language has never been recognised officially, as the Polish language has been—not even in Bukowina, a province in which the Ruthenians are absolutely in the majority. It is, therefore, perhaps not to be wondered at that the sympathy of most of these people is with Russia rather than with Austria. The people of the same race on the other side of the border are known as "Little Russians"—a term which, by the way, is not used derisively, as we use the term "Little Englander," to mean one who has a most paltry conception of Imperial greatness: it simply means an inhabitant of the area known as "Little Russia."

It is noteworthy that there has been begun simultaneously in France and in England a policy of warning the people against regarding the successes already won by the allies as vital. As

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

the "Mining Standard" has pointed out, nothing that has yet occurred will have much influence on the course of the war, except the extent to which the defence of Liege affected the German plan of campaign; the victories in Alsace will scarcely affect things at all, and concerning those in Lorraine there is every reason to be sceptical. The fighting is just beginning, and perhaps in a fortnight's time we may find that the course of the war has been profoundly affected.

V.

September 3, 1914.

It is not a bit of use refusing to face the truth, and the truth as it appears at time of writing, Monday, August 31st, presents many features that are distinctly unpleasant, from the point of view of the allies. What is to be hoped is that we have been told the worst; we can bear to face that; but it is hard indeed to have a consciousness that there is worse remains behind than has been told.

It may be well first of all to dispose of these unfavourable features of the position before considering the favourable ones. There are many signs that the French have suffered more than one serious reverse in the North. The reduction of Namur was also a very serious blow to the allies, and has been followed by a necessary retirement. Serious, too, is the cutting of the British line of communications with Boulogne, necessitating the establishment of a new base. The French defeat at Lille is another unpleasant fact, and it is decidedly unsatisfactory to note that the defence of the frontier at this point had to be entrusted to comparatively untrained men unassisted by either artillery or machine guns. Frankly, that looks like very bad management, and would seem to bear out some of the complaints about the state of the military defences of the Republic that were made just before the outbreak of war. Longwy, too, has fallen, but that is not a matter for surprise; and, if it be true that it was defended by only 800 men, who kept the Germans at bay for over three weeks, then assuredly those men did their duty; and, if it be equally well done elsewhere, the Germans need have little hope of an eventual triumph. Another serious symptom is the abandonment of Upper Alsace by France's southernmost army, which has fallen back on Belfort, to enable troops to be sent North. This may have been due either to the French defeat at Louvain or to the disaster which overcame one of their armies at Neufchateau, an engagement in which the Germans claim to have captured 120 guns and many prisoners, including several generals, but of which no word whatever has come from allied sources. In any case the weakness shown on the French left would have necessitated this reinforcement; but we may be sure that France would not willingly have retreated from Alsace without very serious reason. It is also noteworthy that Uhlans are in the neighbourhood of Amiens, and that the military Governor of Paris has ordered all the residents

MINING STANDARD'S

in the zone of the forts defending the capital to evacuate and destroy their houses within four days. Paris is indeed preparing for eventualities.

It is not easy to get any clear idea of precisely what have been the German gains, but it will probably be found, when the news does filter through, that the British and French forces have been driven back far over the Franco-Belgium border, and that they are probably now concentrated somewhere near Amiens. If this view be correct, the Germans have made astounding progress, and have shown themselves, as they showed themselves in the war of 1870, magnificent fighting men. To have taken so strong a fortress as Namur so speedily was a great feat of arms; and, if they have indeed made the progress that the writer assumes them to have made, they have performed wonders. We hear that their losses have been tremendous, and no doubt they have been; but their leaders have realised that omelettes cannot be made without the breaking of eggs, and that no time must be lost in getting to Paris, whatever the cost. As the attacking party, they have had the advantage of massing their troops so as always to secure a considerable numerical preponderance at the point of contact, and to this fact and their superiority in machine guns is doubtless to be attributed their success, despite the superior rifle fire and artillery practice of the allies. The scouting arrangements also seem to have been very perfect. We hear a great deal of the work done by Zeppelins and aeroplanes in locating the positions of the allied forces; but, when the superiority of the French in aeroplanes is taken into consideration, it is strange that we do not hear more of attacks by their airmen upon the aerial machines and airships of the Germans. The latter seem also to be doing excellent work with their motor cars, and in all these points they appear to be entirely outdoing the allies. They would also seem to have quite deceived the French as to the disposition of their forces. As was predicted by the writer at the very beginning of the war, they have concentrated all their troops in the North, and have left on the Eastern frontier of France only sufficient forces to hold the French in that region. This the French seem not to have realised, with the result that they were able to achieve some slight successes in Alsace, of which an unwarrantably great "song" was made at the time, but which have all come to nought. It seems, too, as if the French made a great mistake in assuming the offensive in Belgium. It is a mistake for which they have paid very bitterly. As was pointed out in these columns, their game was to conduct a strictly defensive campaign until the Russians have had time to advance towards Belgium, and they have suffered by departing from this very obvious necessity.

So much for the bad news; and, as has been said, it is well to face this frankly and fairly. Not to do so is sheer stupidity. There are, however, some very satisfactory items to be considered on the other side. So far as can be seen, the main German army has, largely by British gallantry, been unable to bring about, as they hoped to bring about, another Sedan. If only the French and British can keep their forces intact, falling back

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

when necessary, but not before it is necessary, slowly from position to position, the situation will become more and more serious for the Germans, for, let it not be forgotten, time is on the side of the allies.

This tells in two ways: the Russians are advancing on Berlin; and winter is approaching. It is highly satisfactory to note that the Russian pressure is already becoming so considerable that, taking advantage of the retirement of the French southern force to Belfort, the bulk of the German troops in Alsace have been sent to reinforce the defending army in East Prussia, while also an army corps with full equipment is said to have been withdrawn from the Meuse. If that be true, it may well be the beginning of the end of the attack on France; but it is difficult to see how the Russian pressure can be very great for at least two or three weeks yet. The stories that Russia has eight million men in her four armies is just a little hard to believe. That would be two million, let us say, in the army operating in Eastern Galicia, another two million, in the one operating in Western Galicia, another two million in the one attacking the province of Posen, and yet another two million in the one that has already advanced a considerable distance into East Prussia. If the figures be correct the rate of advance is certain to be exceedingly slow. It is more probable that these four armies consist of about half a million men apiece, with perhaps as many more ready to come up to the support of each. The remaining four million are probably mobilising. Even with armies of from half a million to a million each, the traversing of East Prussia and Posen will prove no easy matter, and there is bound to be a certain amount of delay in effecting the masking of Koenigsberg and Posen before the main forces march on; and they are certain, too, to meet an unpleasant obstacle when they come to the Oder, wherefore it is not to be expected that the entry into Berlin is a matter of a few days only. From the way the man in the street is speaking, one might suppose that the Russians were already in Posen instead of merely marching on it, and that the 160 miles separating Posen from Berlin would be a matter of not more than a week's march. People who talk like that have little understanding of the difficulties attending the transport of a large body of men, artillery, equipment, and food supplies. Another very satisfactory feature of the position is that the Kaiser has ordered the mobilisation of the last reserves. These men are to be employed to protect communications and occupy Belgium, in order to free for serious operations the armies that have hitherto been employed in this work.

Great Britain has gained the victory in a small naval engagement in the North Sea, of value principally as proving that the British retain their superiority as fighters on the sea. It is not likely that this will have any very great bearing upon the course of the war, except in its effect upon the confidence of both sides.

It has been said above that time is on the side of the allies. This is not only the case as regards the movement of the Russian troops towards Berlin, but also as regards the Western theatre of war. If the French, by slowly retiring from position to position can keep the Germans at bay for three months, what sort of a

MINING STANDARD'S

time will the German troops then have in Northern France? It is obvious that for their communications they depend largely upon motor vehicles; but what will become of motor vehicles in the mud and snow and slush of winter? They will have hard work to keep their lines of communication open; and, if they have to fall back on the German frontier through a hostile Belgium, they will suffer agonies that they do not yet dream of. But, even if they have not to make any forced retreat through Belgium, still their position must get worse with time. It is hopeless for them to invest Paris. To take it, they must rush the defences at a fearful cost; and, even if they succeed, how much further forward will they be? In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 the fall of Paris meant the end of the war; in the war of 1914 the fall of Paris, if it should fall, will not necessarily mean the termination of hostilities. The French will still hold Southern France and will still be prepared to fight to the death. The Germans will be far from their base, and will still have the Russians to reckon with; and probably, after holding Paris for two or three weeks, they will be glad to retire and to allow British and French troops to re-enter it. France is not fighting alone, as she fought in 1870, and that fact makes all the difference in the importance of the capture of the capital.

Politically the week has brought no great change. Italy has not yet moved, and her intervention seems to be no nearer than it was a week ago. Turkey, however, seems to be approximately nearer to taking part in the war, and, if it be true that already a thousand German naval men have passed through Bulgaria en route to Constantinople, and that the Porte is carrying out military operations with all speed, then we may take it that before many days have elapsed Turkey also will be at war. That will certainly mean the entry of Greece into the ranks of the allies. There are renewed hopes that Roumania will attack Austria; and presumably Italy will not stay out very long.

It is very satisfactory to note that Indian troops are going to be employed in Europe. To forbid them to take their part in the defence of the Empire would be a gross tactical blunder. One can conceive of no better means of securing loyalty in India than to allow them to take their place by the side of British and Dominion troops in the Imperial fighting line. Let us, for Heaven's sake, take no silly objection to them on the score of their colour.

VI.

September 10, 1914.

Again the Germans have made headway—and indeed tremendous headway. No good is served by endeavouring to minimise the fact that they have accomplished wonders. The defence of Liege seemed to have knocked out their plan of campaign, but the progress they have made since has been extraordinarily rapid, and makes one tremble to think what would

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

have happened had Belgium been more submissive. At time of writing (Monday, September 7) the German troops are at the very gates of Paris, but show no signs of attempting to force an entry; they are acting wisely, for so long as the Anglo-French army remains in the field, strong and unconquered, it will be folly for the German force to ignore it in order to achieve the conquest of Paris, a conquest which, in the present state of things, will not bring the war to a close. Had Great Britain not joined with France, Germany might have relied upon the moral effect of the capture of the chief city of Europe, but she knows that, as things are, she cannot come out victorious in this war until she has wiped out the allied forces.

The tremendous success of the German troops in France has been due, apparently, firstly, to overwhelming numbers, though why there has been such a numerical superiority is not clear; secondly, to a superiority in flying machines, though this is perhaps the greatest surprise of the war, for in these very useful adjuncts to a modern army France was supposed to entirely outdo Germany, though the fact remains that the aeroplanes of the Germans seem to have been of tremendous value to them and to have been interfered with by the allies' flyers to no extent worth speaking about; thirdly, to magnificent organisation—the news, for instance, that each company carries with it a travelling stove, the fire of which is never allowed to go out, enabling one to realise how thoroughly everything has been thought out and provided for; fourthly, to the superiority of the heavy artillery—an unexpected development since the first days of the war, and one which accounts for the quick fall of Namur, their new guns fulfilling the functions both of siege artillery and of field artillery (that is to say, they apparently have the striking efficiency of the former and something approaching the mobility of the latter); fifthly, to a willingness on the part of those in command to take all risks and to sacrifice vast numbers of lives to achieve their ends; and, sixthly, to a readiness which, in all probability, contrasts very markedly with the unreadiness of the French troops, since the Germans have the advantage of having meditated this war and prepared for it—a fact which, in the early stages of a campaign, means a very great deal indeed. How wonderful the German advance has been is shown by the fact that its army has advanced, within three weeks, a distance of something between 150 and 200 miles, while the Franco-British forces have been forced to fall back the greater part of that distance. This is a fact which the tone of the cable messages published in Australia has not made at all clear. We hear a great deal of the retirement of the allies to take up a strong strategic position, but, as a matter of fact, the speed with which they have been forced back is such as to constitute a very great German triumph.

Last week, the present writer, discussing the then position, expressed the opinion that the Germans had got much further south than the cable messages, if taken at their face value, would lead one to believe. The correctness of that view has been amply proved; and so now too it will probably be found that the full

MINING STANDARD'S

seriousness of the position is being minimised. As to the exact situation, it is absolutely futile attempting to describe it on the material provided, much of which is obviously incorrect, and the best of which is imperfect. It seems most probable that the Germans are endeavouring to catch the eastern army of France between two fires, and perhaps at the same time to secure themselves an easier retreat into Germany than will be afforded by the Belgian route, but it is by no means certain that this is the object. If so, it is a bold and indeed risky move, especially as a change of base in front of a strong and active opposing force is a very dangerous operation; but in war, as in business, boldness pays. The German strategy has indeed, so far as we can judge it with our very imperfect knowledge, proved quite remarkable in its audacity, and has certainly lacked nothing in initiative.

A military expert in one of the Melbourne daily papers speaks of the allies' line as stretching up north to Saint Quentin. This is almost certainly wrong, if the news vouchsafed that the British are south of the Marne be correct (as it very likely is not). To endeavour to explain the position is, however, like trying to look through an impenetrable fog, and the few glimpses of the truth vouchsafed to us are complicated by the fact that very much of the news is already ten days old when it arrives. This is a circumstance which the reader needs to bear in mind, for he is continually receiving news of engagements in areas from which the allies have long since retired; and this helps to mislead him as to the position of our forces.

One gets hints now and then of German successes of which we have directly heard little or nothing. The facts that on one day 680 British prisoners arrived at Doberitz, and that the next day another 2000 arrived, mean some surrenders of British forces. Why these facts should not be told it is difficult to say. Instead of doing harm they would do good, for they would rouse all the bull-dog obstinacy of the British people. We hear that in Great Britain there is a boom in recruiting, owing to the growing realisation of the fact that the Germans must be stopped. The vouchsafing of proper information to us here of any British disaster would perhaps bring about a similar result.

Another instance of the way in which the cable news has proved misleading is afforded by the information that the German troops are only now falling back from the frontier of Russian Poland, and that the Russians are about to begin their advance. It is long ago since we heard that they were already marching on Posen, and a word of warning was given in these columns as to the absurdity of assuming a very speedy entry by the Russian troops into Berlin. It was then pointed out that they had yet to reach Posen. It now turns out that that warning might have been made stronger, for they had not then even started for Posen. It is interesting, by the way, to note that the Kaiser has assured the Poles that they can expect from him a regeneration of the Polish race through western culture. After the Poles' experiences of Prussian faith, and after what the world has seen of the re-

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

sults of German "culture" during the past month, the Poles are not likely to be tempted by this assurance.

The week's news mentions the capture of Amiens by the Germans. This is worth mentioning for the fact that Amiens was at one time a strongly-fortified city, but the ramparts have been turned into boulevards, and so the city became an easy prey to the invader. Perhaps the citizens are less proud now of their boulevards than they were before. This also is the case of Breslau, the most important city in Prussian Silesia, the residents of which may, like those of Amiens, have reason to regret that they sacrificed security to pleasure.

Whether or no German troops have been removed from the Western theatre of war to the Eastern is still in doubt. It is more than likely that, as suggested, most of the stories of the transfer of troops to meet the Russian pressure were due to the fact that train-loads of wounded were going west. It may be doubted if Germany has really removed any effective troops whatever from the forces operating in Belgium and Northern France.

The victory of the Russians in the vicinity of Lemberg seems to have been tremendously crushing. It is not necessary to accept the statement that the Austrian army lost 200,000 men to believe that the Dual Monarchy has suffered a blow from which it will not find it easy to recover. For 70,000 men to have been captured means that the Austrian forces have had perhaps the most tremendous blow in the whole of their very chequered history, the most extraordinary thing in which is the way in which the Empire has always recovered from disasters that would have wiped out many a nation apparently far stronger. The Petrograd military authorities are perhaps not far wrong in surmising that this disaster practically wipes out Austria as an effective support to Germany, and it is not to be overlooked that the occupation of Lemberg will prove a severe blow to Austrian strategy, since that city is a meeting-place of several railway lines, and, with it in the hands of the Russians, the concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia will be rendered much more difficult than it was previously. Apart from this, the news of this fearful disaster will spread like wildfire through all the subject races of the Empire, and it assuredly will not help to check disaffection in Bohemia, nor to make the Magyar dominion easier in Croatia. It may also tempt Roumania not to delay in an attempt to secure Transylvania, since if she wait too long she is likely to meet with objection on the part of the allies to her participation in the fruits of victory without having done anything to warrant it.

There are many people who imagine the death of Frances Joseph at the present moment would occur at an exceedingly unfortunate time for the Empire that he has ruled so long. That is probably an incorrect view. Had he died in time of peace there might quite possibly have been a disagreement between Hungary and Austria as to the succession. At the present time neither monarchy can afford a disagreement. People say that the subject Slav races may make trouble; but, if they make trouble, it will not be on account of the death of the Emperor; they will do it

MINING STANDARD'S

if they see the chance to throw off the German yoke in Austria or the Magyar yoke in Hungary, whether Francis Joseph be alive or dead.

The arrangements come to by the allies that none of them will make peace separately, and that none of them will demand any terms not agreed to by the others, is excellent news. Without such an agreement there is always the chance of allies being divided, by one of them being granted satisfactory terms, to detach it from the alliance. It is a wise decision for the three countries to have come to.

Canada is taking this war very seriously—much more seriously, apparently, than many people in Australia are inclined to take it. When one is told that a force of at least 300,000 men is to be placed on a war basis throughout the Dominion, and that the militia proposes to train 1,000,000 Canadians to shoot straight at a range of 1000 yards, it is obvious that "Our Lady of the Snows" is realising fully her responsibility as a member of the Empire.

I.

August 6, 1914.

The position at time of writing (Monday, August 3rd) is that Austria has declared war against Serbia and that Germany has declared war against Russia, because Russia was preparing to resist Austria's aggression against the little Balkan State. That other countries will be drawn into this conflict is almost as sure as that the sun will rise; France is bound to Russia under the terms of her alliance, and Germany realising that fact has already taken steps that amount to a declaration of war. She has seized some of France's locomotives on their entering German territory; she has demanded with an imperativeness which is characteristic of German methods, an answer within 18 hours to her question whether France will remain neutral in the war between Germany and Russia, and she has deliberately violated the neutrality of Luxemburg by crossing the frontier of that State and seizing the railway station of its capital. War between Germany and France is therefore as certain as war between Germany and Russia; but war will not be confined to the five countries already named. Italy is an ally of Austria and Germany, and Great Britain is a partner with France and Russia in the Triple Entente; but even beyond these there will be a vast number of other countries to be involved. Roumania is at present under Russian influence, and is likely to take part in the conflict; Greece, under the terms of her alliance with Serbia, is understood to be obliged to supply troops in the case of an attack on Servian territory; Montenegro will probably attempt to do her little bit to help her sister State; Turkey will probably take advantage of the opportunity to attack Greece; and Bulgaria, although it has declared itself neutral, may possibly also take a hand, though probably not till it has seen how events are shaping. The Albanians are also certain to take part in the trouble; and other small States whose neutrality is

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

likely to be violated, and which may, therefore, be drawn into the conflict, are Switzerland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland. Spain is understood to be in some degree a member of the Entente, and Japan and Portugal are allies of Great Britain; and all of these may be involved to some slight extent, though they can scarcely affect the result of the war in any way. It is likely, too, that China, taking advantage of Russia's position, will endeavour to regain possession of that part of Mongolia which has shaken off her suzerainty. The two main questions are, however, what will Great Britain do, and what will Italy do?

The position as regards Italy is that, though a member of the Triple Alliance, she is actuated above all other things by a feeling of animosity towards and distrust of Austria, and we may therefore be absolutely certain that she will not go to the assistance of Austria if she can help it. A good deal will depend, doubtless, on what she may anticipate will be the result of the conflict. If she come to the conclusion that the central European States are likely to emerge victorious, she will not run the risk of being blamed for playing them false; if, however, she consider the Entente Powers the stronger, she will probably prefer to remain out of the struggle, more especially as she has everything to gain by doing so. She has not long emerged from a trying campaign in Northern Africa, and she has yet to consolidate her newly-acquired territory there; she has, therefore, already announced her neutrality, on the grounds that Austria did not consult her when she issued an ultimatum to Servia, and that she does not feel bound to follow Austria in what is really a war of aggression. Her attitude may, however, be entirely changed by the extension of the war to include Russia and Germany, and her attitude remains dubious; in any case, however, even if she side with her nominal allies, she will do so with no very good grace, and that is a matter which will materially affect her usefulness. On the whole, we hardly anticipate that Italy will take a very noteworthy part in the war which is just beginning.

Great Britain's attitude is more easy to define. Despite her always loquacious pacifists, she is almost certain to take an active part in the struggle; she can do so with reason—indeed, is in honour bound to do so—so soon as German troops cross the French frontier; but it is likely that the nominal cause of her entering the field of operations will be the violation of Belgian territory by Germany—a violation which is certain to be one of the very earliest incidents of the campaign. There are thousands of good people, mostly those who have not the slightest understanding of world politics, who fail to see why England should be drawn in; but, after all, terrible thing as war is, there are still worse things, and a worse thing is the loss of honour and the sense of honour, and Great Britain will indeed be utterly shamed if, after entering on the Entente for her own advantage, she desert her partners in their hour of need. Not only would such action on her part be dishonourable, but it would be foolish in the extreme; it would mean that England would never again find any country to enter into a defensive agreement with her, because no country would

MINING STANDARD'S

trust her; it would mean, probably, that, when the adversaries of the present moment had patched up their quarrels and come to terms, they would combine against Great Britain with the object of crushing her out of existence; so that, either from the point of view of policy, or from the point of view of fidelity to agreements, England must take her place by the side of her comrades. There are many people who say that she should wait until she finds France going under, and should then come to her assistance; in other words, she should not endeavour to put out the fire while it is a small conflagration, but should wait until it has got beyond control; for let it be understood that the help that Great Britain can give on land will be comparatively small. Of all the five great Powers that are certain to be engaged in this war, Great Britain will be by long odds the most insignificant in the fighting that has to be done on land; nor let it be forgotten that it is on land that the quarrel must be fought out. The English fleet may do great work in destroying Germany's commerce or in bottling up her fleet; but that is all; and that will not settle the war. People in Australia, probably the majority of people in England, have a very absurdly exaggerated idea as to what can be accomplished by the British fleet. It will not be able to destroy the German fleet, because in all probability it will not be able to attack it. That fleet will remain in a harbour that the British fleet will scarcely dare to enter—can only enter at the very gravest risk of destruction from mines and submarines. It will most likely establish a blockade; but that blockade will not crush Germany as a counter blockade by Germany would, under different circumstances, crush England, because, while England cannot feed herself, Germany can feed herself to a very large extent. What the British will be able to do will be to drive German commerce from the seas, and to land a couple of hundred thousand troops to support France; but even that will depend upon the speed with which those troops can be mobilised, for Germany will act with exceeding promptitude. If, however, the German fleet should venture into the open, the first important news we are likely to get is that of its destruction by the British naval force.

It seems to be taken for granted in the Melbourne dailies that Germany will hasten to attack Russia in full force. She will probably do nothing of the sort; she is more likely to pursue a defensive policy on her western frontier, keeping there no more men than are sufficient to hold back any forces that Russia may have ready to throw across the border. She will do this because she will reckon that it will take Russia six or eight weeks to mobilise a sufficiently strong force to constitute any real menace to Germany, and meantime she will be free to throw the great bulk of her troops over the French frontier in the hope that she will be able to strike a series of deadly blows at France before Russia has been able to properly get going; she believes, in fact, that she can knock France to her knees before it will be necessary for her to really pay any serious attention to Russia. It will be found, too, that the main attack upon France will not be directly across the French frontier from Alsace-Lorraine, but will

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

involve a violation of Belgian territory. It is notorious that the whole of the German strategic plans for an attack on France were thrown into the melting pot as a result of the revelation of the extreme difficulty of reducing fortresses that was made by the defence of Port Arthur against the Japanese. Germany then began to understand for the first time that she would not be able to rush across the French territory with the speed she had anticipated, because the great forts at Verdun, Toul, and other places could not be left unconquered in the rear. Therefore, the German strategists turned their attention to the discovery of a new mode of entering on the country they had long doomed to extinction; and they decided that their best course lay in the moving of troops promptly through Belgian territory, in order to get at France where she was not so strongly protected. This, of course, involves a breach of faith with Belgium; but that is not going to stand in Germany's way. Every railway that Germany has built recently in this quarter has been built purely for strategic purposes, to enable troops to be rushed down to the Belgian frontier as promptly as possible. Its railways go to that frontier, and, significantly enough, end there. We think it will, therefore, be found that within the next two or three days we will get word of vast masses of German troops being rushed across the Belgian border, and, if we do not get such word, it will be only because we are not allowed to hear what is really being done.

If this be Germany's policy, it stands to reason that France's policy will be to act on the defensive; she will not endeavour to force matters, but will be content to play the game that "Joe" Johnston played so successfully against Sherman in the American Civil War. If she can hold the German armies off until Russia is ready to strike in force, Germany's position may be serious; it is quite likely, too, that France will endeavour to detach some portion of Germany's main army by sending an odd corps or two across the German frontier into Alsace-Lorraine, but these will only be diversions, to which not too much importance must be attached. When Britain sends a force to France's aid, it will almost certainly be to the main theatre of operations in or near Belgium.

As to how long the war will last and what will be the outcome of it, we will venture no prediction; but we regret to say that we cannot share the certainty which so many people seem to feel that Germany will get all the worst of it. The usual reason for this view is that while Great Britain will attack her at sea, she will be attacked by land from the East by Russia and from the West by France. This view is altogether mistaken; Germany will not be attacked by France: on the contrary, France is the country that will be attacked; Germany's war against France will be offensive, and not defensive; and the members of the Triple Entente may reckon themselves fortunate if France do not sustain a series of crushing defeats long before Russia is ready to make any effective move against Germany. The people who look to see Germany overwhelmed would appear to be entirely ignorant of one very vital fact and one great strategical truth.

MINING STANDARD'S

The fact I refer to is that Russia has not sufficient strategic railways running down to the German border to be able to get her troops there in any sufficient numbers in time to strike with force before there is a danger of the French armies being overwhelmed; and the military principle which is overlooked is that the country having interior lines fights at a great advantage; that is to say, Germany, lying between France and Russia, is not placed like a nut between nutcrackers, but is so fortunately situated as to be able to rush her troops from one frontier to another as she may require them; and, the better to be able to do so, she has constructed a network of railways that are of the very first importance for the carrying out of this intention.

One thing that the Entente Powers may hope for, and indeed should look for eagerly, is the participation of Roumania in the conflict; for, if Roumania enter the field against Austria, that Power will be very seriously hampered, both in her offensive against Servia and in her defensive against Russia, for the Roumanian army is for its size one of the finest in Europe, and even in point of numbers is not to be sneezed at, since it amounts to half a million of men.

As for Germany's object, it may be taken for granted that the main one it has in view is the acquisition of Holland and Belgium. With the possession of these two countries she could not only dominate France, but would be in the position of having a loaded pistol levelled at the head of England. With France crushed by the infliction of an enormous indemnity and practically placed under German tutelage, England's position would be deplorable, and Germany would be the greatest of world powers. The reality of this danger ensures England's participation in the war, and the seriousness of it affords, perhaps, the strongest hope that the German wishes will not be realised.

II.

August 13, 1914.

The position as disclosed by the cables published in the papers to-day (August 10) show that a great change has come over the scene since the present writer gave his views in the "Mining Standard" of last week. The seven days' later news has been, on the whole, very disadvantageous to Germany. Little has happened as she expected, and little as she desired. During that period Great Britain and Belgium have both declared war, and the hostilities begun against France have been confirmed by the withdrawal of the respective Ambassadors of the two countries. The participation of Great Britain can hardly be a great surprise to the Kaiser, but the pugnacious attitude assumed by Belgium must have been something altogether unlooked for, and is as unpleasant as it was unexpected. The opposition of Belgium threatens indeed to throw all the plans of Germany out of gear; it has given France the time that she so badly needed, and, moreover, the excellent work done by the Belgian troops in resisting the attacks on Liege must have had great effect in improving

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

the morale of the French troops and in disheartening the enemy. The Kaiser had fully anticipated that Belgium would be too frightened of the tremendous strength of the German Empire to venture to offer any resistance to encroachments on her territory, and had anticipated that the fortresses of Liège and Namur would either be surrendered without a struggle, or would be occupied inoffensively, the garrison, under instructions from the Government, conducting itself on strictly neutral principles. This would have left Germany free to advance into French territory without having to trouble greatly about guarding her lines of communication. As it is, she has already lost a week of valuable time; and, even if Liège fall before the violent assaults of her troops, she will still have the fortress of Namur to overcome. Belgium would seem, in short, to have saved France from the danger she ran of being overwhelmed by the German forces before Russia could really "get a move on."

Almost equally disappointing to Germany, and perhaps even more serious, is the failure of Italy to come to her assistance. This Germany ought to have foreseen; but she would appear to have been under the impression that she could dragoon Italy into participation in the war as her ally against Italy's own wishes. By entering on an entirely offensive war—by, indeed, deliberately bringing it about—she afforded Italy a most admirable excuse for the non-fulfilment of her military obligations, since it enabled Italy to say that, as the Triple Alliance was an alliance for defensive purposes, she could not fairly be called upon to fight in a war which had not been forced upon Germany and Austria, but had been deliberately sought by them. The sympathy of Italy is indeed entirely with the Entente; and, if Germany be so foolish as to force her to take up arms on one side or the other, she will be driving her into the arms of France and Great Britain. There is all the more danger (or, from our own point of view, all the more hope) of this on account of Italy's violent hatred of and rivalry with Austria. The hatred is traditional, and dates from the time when Austria held much territory that is now Italian; and it is kept alive by the fact that portion of the territory she holds to-day is also Italian. Her greatest seaport, Trieste, belongs racially to Italy, and so does that portion of Tyrol known as the Trentino. Italy also claims Dalmatia as Italian; but this is not so, the bulk of the people in that province being of the Serbo-Croatian race. The rivalry between Austria and Italy is due to the desire of both of them to have command of the Adriatic; and Italy would attack Austria with great gusto if she thought that what she still calls "*Italia Irredenta*" would, as a result, be incorporated within her boundaries. It is unquestionably to Germany's interest, if she cannot have Italy's support, to have her remain neutral; but her action has been so high-handed throughout that it is not at all certain that she will not be mad enough to drive Italy, like Belgium, into the arms of her antagonists. If so, Italy will not merely prove a severe nut for the Austrian navy to crack in the Adriatic, but will also necessitate the bunching of

some 300,000 or 400,000 men on the Austro-Italian frontier. By thus crippling Austria, Germany will, of course, be crippling herself.

The number of countries now engaged in active war operations numbers at least seven—Austria, Servia, Germany, Russia, France, Belgium, and Great Britain; also we have news that Montenegro has declared war against Austria, and Portugal is understood to have informed Germany that she sides with England, as indeed she is bound to do under treaty. Besides these, we have a definite occupation of Luxemburg territory by Germany, and reported violations of the neutrality of Switzerland and Holland; and, as if this were not enough, we have it announced that the Albanians are about to attack or have already attacked Servia, though, in this case, it will not be the Albanian Government, but rather the Albanian insurgents who are acting. The participation of Montenegro in the war will not make a vast amount of difference; but Portugal's action is of importance, not because her treaty provides for her being called upon to put 10,000 troops in the field on behalf of Great Britain, but because it will close all her ports to German ships. There are plenty of signs of unrest, too, in Bulgaria, Turkey, and Roumania, and it is very unlikely that these three countries and Greece will not be drawn in sooner or later. Roumania will probably wait to see if things go badly with Austria in her conflict with Russia. If they do, she may be trusted to make an endeavour to get a good foothold in Transylvania, the bulk of the population of which are Roumanian-speaking, and which she therefore looks upon much as Italy looks upon Trieste.

The Austro-Servian war has sunk into the background in face of the much bigger issues with which the world is now concerned, but there can be little doubt that in this quarter Austria has utterly failed to fulfil her purpose. That purpose was to crush Servia before hostilities broke out against Russia. Just as Germany expected to be in Paris within a month or six weeks, so Austria expected to have Servia reduced to a condition of impotence in a week or two. Actually, she would seem to have accomplished nothing; and, if the cabled news is to be trusted, her troops have been transferred from this theatre of war to Galicia to meet the threatened Russian advance. Servia is now preparing to carry the war into Austrian territory, and has already invaded Bosnia. She may expect to get a good deal of assistance from the Bosnians themselves, who would much rather be united to Servia than under the Austrian domination—at least the Orthodox section of the population assuredly would be. There is also news of the mutiny of one of the Czech regiments of the Austrian army; this is not without its significance, because it is probably the outcome of the sympathy which the Czechs have always had with the Southern Slavs and their movement for freedom. If such mutiny should become of common occurrence, it will be a bad lookout for the Austrian empire.

We pointed out last week that Germany had the advantage of position in the matter of strategy; but she would appear to be

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

imperilling her advantage by the utter stupidity of her tactics. The advances of her troops in close formation upon a heavily fortified position such as Liege constituted a most reckless and wicked sacrifice of life. They serve to show, what the "Times" critic of the German military manoeuvres two or three years ago pointed out, that the Germans still conduct war on the lines followed during the campaign of 1870. The attempt to rush Liege is not without its reason, because time is the essence of the contract so far as Germany is concerned; but, although a vast loss of life is necessary if the forts are to be reduced as quickly as possible, it shows wofully bad management to have troops advancing in close formation to make an easy mark for the enemy's guns. The artillery of to-day is not what it was 44 years ago, and the tactics that were successful then can scarcely be successful now.

It looks, too, as if not only the tactics but also the organisation of the German army is badly at fault; their idea of organisation seems to be to attain a rapid mobilisation, and in this respect, no doubt, they have little to learn. But when we find that the army is, if the messages which have reached us are to be credited, running short of food, it is obvious that the general arrangements leave much to be desired. In their overweening confidence the Germans are apt to make no provision for defeat; and so, too, they seem to have made no provision against delays; they were so confident that there would be no opposition to them in Belgium that they did not think it necessary to provide provisions for their army, which would be speedily into France, where it could feed itself. Even in France, however, this was rather much to take for granted, since it was certain that the French troops, as they retreated, would destroy all food supplies, so that the invading army might be hampered as much as possible.

Another difficulty which the German army will probably have to contend with will be a heavy loss in officers, not so much by reason of any particular attention paid to them by the marksmen of the enemy, as because of the animus entertained towards them by their own soldiers. German officers have earned such a shocking reputation for arrogance and inhumanity, and these characteristics have been so successfully followed by the non-coms., that it will probably be found that very many of these gentry will suffer an ignominious death by being shot in the back—not by the enemy, but by their own troops.

As for Great Britain's part in the war, there is as yet nothing to be said. There have been all sorts of rumours of a great battle in the North Sea, but Mr. Winston Churchill has given them an emphatic denial. It may, we think, be taken for granted that if a great naval battle be fought it will not be fought in the North Sea. If the German fleet come out into the open at all to fight, which is unlikely, it will be only in the narrow waters that cut Denmark into islands, where it can fight at an advantage that will neutralise the disparity in forces; or perhaps these waters will be heavily mined, and the German fleet will proceed up the Baltic to endeavour to deal with the Russian navy. In any

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

case, the British fleet is bound to have a very difficult and dangerous task before it, and it can afford to take no risks, since the loss of very few of its battleships, whether by mines or by torpedoes, would destroy British superiority, in which case there would be the danger, not only of her commerce being ruined, but of the country being starved into submission. That is a risk not lightly to be taken; and, therefore, if, as may be anticipated, the German navy decline to come out into the North Sea, the only safe thing for the British fleet to do is to bottle it up in the Baltic or, if possible, in the Kiel Canal.

One of the cables received last week was to the effect that a great French victory had been achieved in Southern Alsace, and that 30,000 casualties had been sustained by the Germans. The story of the victory is undoubtedly correct, but the number of German casualties is probably a very gross exaggeration. It will probably be found that the losses did not amount to one-tenth of the number reported. The object of the French is probably not so much to carry the war into German territory as to create sufficient diversion to prevent the despatch of any troops to the help of those in front of Liege. That is a sense in which the offensive is liable to constitute the wisest defensive. There is, however, another reason for the French assuming the offensive in this region, even though they may not do so elsewhere, since they are doubtless in hopes of a great national rising on the part of the Alsatians, who are strongly French in sympathy, and have had over 40 years of unhappiness under the German yoke. If France can succeed in regaining portion of this lost province, and if any large proportion of the population rally to the French standard, the effect on Germany will be very serious, since the news will be apt to create a feeling of unrest amongst the other tyrannised peoples—the Poles of Prussian Poland and the Danes of Schleswig—who have suffered the bitterness of Prussian rule for so many years.

A question that arises is, What is Great Britain going to do about the spies within its borders? We find France quite rightly executing German residents who are found in possession of wireless apparatus, and we have Germany going very much further and putting to death people in Alsace who are suspected of merely sympathising with the French, massacring communities where two or three civilians have shot at their troops, and warring even against children. Without suggesting that British people ought to imitate the bloody and barbarous methods of the Germans, they certainly should imitate the methods which the French are adopting to put a stop to treachery amongst residents. The cable announces that vast numbers of German residents of London have been found to be in possession of wireless apparatus, and others to have concealed in their houses guns, ammunition, and bombs; and now we are informed that English troop trains have been fired upon. In every case these men, if captured, should be summarily court-martialled and hanged. In times of war mercy to spies and to traitors is not to be thought of, since it constitutes an encouragement to treachery and espionage.

HOW THE AUSTRO-SERB WAR BEGAN.

August 6, 1914.

There are four main causes of the present outbreak of war in Europe. The first is racial hatred; the second is the power of the Austrian military caste, which believes it to be to its interest to force a war; the third is the belief of Austria and Germany that they had the Triple Entente at a momentary disadvantage; the fourth is that Austria is fearful of the rise of a strong Slavic power on its southern borders. The first and fourth of these are closely connected, and so are the other two; let us, then, consider these causes as two in number, taking, firstly, the question of racial hatreds and Austrian fear of Serbia.

Austria-Hungary, it must be understood, is not a compact nation, but rather an empire, the head of which governs peoples of different races. There is, in fact, an Austrian nation, but no Austrian nationality. It consists of Austria proper, which contains no less than 17 provinces, each with its own separate diet, and Hungary (which is itself divisible into two parts—Hungary proper and Croatia, which not only has its own provincial diet, but also has a large measure of autonomy, of which Hungary is constantly engaged in endeavouring to rob it, with the result that the feeling between the Croatians and the Hungarians is the reverse of friendly); and, finally, there is Bosnia, which belongs to Austria and Hungary jointly. In Austria, at the latest census, there was a population of $28\frac{1}{4}$ millions, of whom 10 millions were of German race, $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions Czech and Slovak, 5 millions Polish, $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions Ruthenian, $1\frac{1}{4}$ million Slovenian, $\frac{3}{4}$ million Servian (Croatian), $\frac{3}{4}$ million Italian, and $\frac{1}{4}$ million Roumanian. This is taking language as the basis of nationality. The same must be done in considering the constituents of the population of Hungary; but the test is by no means fair, since the Government endeavours to force the Magyar language on everybody, and counts everyone as Magyar who can speak the language; even then, however, we find that, out of a population of 21 millions, Magyars number only 10 millions, Roumanians three, Germans two, Slovenians two, Servians (Croatians) three, and Ruthenians half. Bosnia has a population of two millions, practically wholly Servian. This gives us for the empire a population of $51\frac{1}{4}$ millions, of whom 23 per cent. are German, 20 per cent. Magyar, and 46 per cent. Slavic (the Western Slavs numbering 17 per cent. of the total, the North-

MINING STANDARD'S

Eastern Slavs 18, and the Southern Slavs 11). The hatreds between these various races is something that people who have never been in the Austrian Empire can scarcely conceive of. The Germans are bitterly hated both by the Czechs and by the Magyars, and also by the Italians; the Hungarians (that is to say, the Magyars) have aroused the bitter hatred of every race they hold subject to them; and, as if this were not enough, we have amongst such kindred peoples as the Poles and the Ruthenians the same intense loathing for one another. All this does not make for the soundness of the Austrian Empire, but it helps to make the attitude of that Empire understandable. It is always afraid of its Slavic neighbours; it is afraid that the Roumanians in Transylvania, weary of the shameless and dishonest tyranny of their Magyar rulers, would welcome union with the independent people of their own race further south; it knows, too, that the unjustly treated men of Servian race who live in Croatia and the men of the same race who were, against their will, brought into the country when Austria took possession of Bosnia, look with a measure of pride and hope to their independent brethren in Serbia, although there is one stumbling block here, in that they are cut off from full communion with the men of the Servian kingdom by the difference of religion, since they are Roman Catholics, while the Servian people are Orthodox, and in this region religious hatreds are as bitter as racial animosities. The Austrian Government is aware, too, that the Czechs sympathise with their South Slavic brethren. It then becomes vitally necessary for Austria that Serbia should be reduced to a position of impotence, and this has been one of the principal aims of Austrian diplomacy for the past decade.

The loyalty of the Serbo-Croat people might perhaps have been assured by turning the dual monarchy into a triple one; but, if an attempt to effect this were made, Hungary would take up arms to prevent it, and so, willy-nilly, the Government has had to repress the aspirations of the race that is the most numerous in the dominion of the Emperor-King.

The one amusing feature in the Austrian Emperor's pronouncement of the reasons actuating him in declaring war against Serbia was his complaint of Servian ingratitude for all that Austria had done for it. What Austria has done for it is to hold it in most complete economic subjection, to force it to do all its trade with Austria, while allowing it to reap the very minimum of benefit from that trade. It has bullied and threatened the little kingdom on every possible occasion, and scarcely allowed it to have a soul of its own; then, when in 1908 Serbia dared to resent the action of the Austrian Emperor in extending his sovereignty over the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina—an action which threatened to definitely shut her off from all access to the sea, and to rob her finally of all hopes of welding the Servian people of the Balkan Peninsula into a compact whole—Austria took the most high-handed action, and, with German help, deprived Serbia of Russia's support, and brought the little kingdom to its knees. Serbia did not forgive, but she submitted with as good a grace

as possible, and set to work to repair the mischief as best she could. She did it by entering into alliances with Bulgaria and Greece, by participating with them in the war against Turkey, and by reaping advantages accruing from the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. This was by no means to Austria's taste. She had seen with great satisfaction Serbia go to war, fully expecting that her puny enemy would be thereby reduced to a state of impotence for a generation to come; and, when, to her disgust, the allies proved to be successful, she engineered with the not-too-scrupulous Ferdinand of Bulgaria, a breach of the alliance between Serbia and her Eastern neighbour, and once again was disappointed, inasmuch as, to her surprise and disgust, Serbia proved altogether too strong for her supposedly much more powerful neighbour. Ever since then, Austria, which had again succeeded in blocking the Servian desire to obtain access to the Adriatic, has only waited an opportunity for striking at the realm of King Peter. But she had to be very careful how she did it, for Russia looked upon herself as the protectress of the Southern Slav States, and Russia was not likely to submit, as she had submitted in 1908, to the bullying of Germany. For Austria to get even with Serbia (and to get even meant to reduce Serbia to its previous economic dependence on the dual monarchy) opportunity was necessary, and that opportunity Austria-Hungary thought it saw when Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Monarchy, and his morganatic wife, were assassinated in Serajevo.

This brings us to a consideration of the other cause of the war, the combination of the desire for war on the part of the military caste with the belief that a chance had arisen for striking at the Triple Entente when the odds were all in favour of the dual monarchy and her allies. Here, in the first place, was an excellent excuse. The assassinations were the work of the Servians; they were believed (or it was pretended they were believed) to have been engineered in Serbia; and it is quite possible that there has been, as Austria has so often asserted, a strong agitation in Servian, and also in Croatian circles, for the union of all the Serb-speaking peoples under the one flag. Austria-Hungary was, however, strong enough to be able to afford to take no notice of the pro-Servian movement in Croatia, had it not been for the fact that the authorities were quite well aware that those movements were due, in the main, to the oppression and injustice which the Croats suffered. Here, then, was a good excuse (and it was really nothing but an excuse) for an attack on Serbia; but was the moment propitious? Was it certain that Serbia would receive no help from outside; or, if she did receive help, would that help be sufficient to enable her to set Austria at defiance? The Emperor's advisers and those in charge of affairs in Germany believed that the time was opportune. They saw Russia torn by serious labour troubles: they knew that Serbia had far from recovered from the effects of her two recent wars; they saw the United Kingdom on the very verge of a civil war that, being mainly religious, was bound to be one of the bloodiest and bitterest in her entire history; and they had noticed with delight revelations of

the unpreparedness of France for war, owing to shocking mismanagement, or something worse than mismanagement, in the equipment of her men and the equipment of her fortresses. If that was the calculation of Germany and Austria it was not altogether sound, for, as we have seen, results of the development of the crisis were a quick settlement of labour troubles in Russia and a postponement of the conflict in Ireland.

It will be noticed that it is here assumed that Germany was entirely with Austria in the action taken by that Power. That that was so is clearly manifested by the attitude Germany has assumed throughout the crisis. It is quite unreasonable to suppose that Austria would, without first consulting Germany, launch an ultimatum against any country when there was the likelihood of a big European war resulting. If she did so, it is almost certain that Germany would decline to be led by the nose into an adventure of which she did not approve, and to which she had not first given her sanction. It may be taken, therefore, for granted that Germany was, from the first, Austria's partner in this crime against civilisation, and if further proof be needed, it is afforded by her subsequent conduct. When Great Britain proposed joint action by herself, France, Italy, and Germany, the only country which did not respond favourably was Germany, the excuse she made being the altogether absurd one that, as Austria's ally, she could not join in any such effort, though France, as Russia's ally, was quite willing to do so. She would seem, in fact, to have been bent on war, and to have been only beating time to enable her to complete her preparations: and all her talk of desire for peace was mere deceit to prevent France and Russia and Great Britain from taking similar action. This tendency to deceit has always been a characteristic of Prussian diplomacy; and Germany, which is still governed by Prussia, has inherited the tendency. The same outrageous lying, the same attempts to deceive the intended victim, the same unscrupulous efforts to make the victim seem the aggressor, marked Germany's relations with Denmark in 1864, her relations with Austria in 1866, and her relations with France in 1870. In each case Germany posed as the peace-loving country that was cruelly forced into war for which she had not the least desire; and we all know now how the revelations of Bismarck and others have shown that all three of those wars were deliberately engineered by the Prussian Government. We have the same attempt now to throw on Russia the blame for the present outbreak of war; we have Austria taking steps that it knows will lead to war; we have it framing its demands on Servia in such a way that no self-respecting country can possibly accede to them; we have Russia mobilising for the protection of Servia from the attack on it which seems to be imminent; and then we have Germany pretending that Russia's mobilisation is quite unnecessary, regarding it as a threat of aggressive war by Russia, and demanding a cessation of mobilisation within 12 hours. But Russia, though she had to submit to being browbeaten by the champion browbeater of Europe in 1908, is not ready to submit to-day,

COMMENTS ON THE WAR.

and therefore we have the whole of Europe hurled into the cauldron of war.

We have spoken above about the mutual hatreds of the various peoples in the Austrian Empire; but also there are vast international hatreds which have their place in helping to bring the countries of Europe into war. For 120 years past Germany has always been very respectful to Russia, except on the occasion already referred to, when she had her at a gigantic disadvantage, in 1908; but the two peoples have had for one another a quite extraordinary animosity. This has not been reflected in the relations of the two Governments, only for the reason that Germany has ever been afraid of Russia and of the dissatisfied Poles in Prussian Poland. These Poles are kindred people with the Russians, but hate them with a bitter hatred; and small wonder, when one considers the treatment that their country received from Muscovy! But, bitterly as they hate the Russians, they hate the Prussians still more, because the Prussian Government has not been very much better than the Russian Government, and the Prussian people have been infinitely more tyrannical than the Russian people; and, moreover, there is the memory of the gross treachery—one of the most disgraceful pieces of treachery in all history—whereby Prussia took part in the partition of the old Kingdom of Poland, to which it was bound by a defensive alliance. It has always been Prussia's aim to keep Russia from making friends with her Polish subjects; and there has been a definite understanding or something more than an understanding between the two countries that neither would make any concession to its Polish subjects without the knowledge and approval of the other. This agreement has been all to the advantage of Prussia, for, had Russia won the affection of her Polish subjects by conceding them a certain measure of autonomy and by treating them with fairness and justice, the Poles in German territory would have constituted a very grave menace to the Fatherland, inasmuch as their province comes up to within easy striking distance of Berlin.

But it is not only Germans and Russians who hate one another: there is an inveterate hatred between French and German, and also between German and English. There may be people who have been misled by the fact that a few days ago the crowd—or what was represented as the crowd—in Berlin gave cheers for Great Britain outside the British Embassy. That is the sort of thing which is very easily engineered in Germany; and no doubt it was arranged for the express purpose of being telegraphed to London, in order to strengthen the hands of the British peace party, with the object of detaching Britain from the Triple Entente. Similarly, we had assertions in the German Press that the peace of Europe depended upon the attitude of Great Britain, that if she would only declare her neutrality there would be no fear of war. This, of course, was the veriest piece of bluff. If there was one thing that made Germany hesitate to declare war upon Russia, it was the fear that England would not be neutral: had she been assured of her neutrality, war would have come long ago; and also it serves to show the German intention to cast

all the blame on England in the case of war eventuating between the two countries. Germany has, as already intimated, a very pretty and unscrupulous knack of putting the blame on those who are her victims, and Germans still talk about the perfidy of England in abandoning Prussia at the close of the Seven Years' War, when, as a matter of fact, the King of Prussia had, from the very commencement of that war, been endeavouring to "sell" his allies, and was always cursing his luck that he had never been able to succeed. There can be little doubt that all the blame for this war will be cast by the German historians of the future on the shoulders of England and Russia. Impartial historians will not be deceived by that fact, but will see that it has been quite deliberately brought about by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

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